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RECRUITING THE PROFESSION
By Roger H. Wolcott of the Denver Bar
(Dean of the Law School of the University of Denver)

LEGAL directory lists 1625 attorneys in Colorado,

1050 of them in Denver, and 575 elsewhere in the state.
The list includes judges, and includes some persons
who are giving their main attention to enterprises other than
practice, but even after such deductions, the showing is impressive. The length of the roll is due to past rules of admission and not to present rules. After allowing for deaths and
withdrawals annually, the list is probably increasing each
year by thirty or forty names, as sixty-three new attorneys
were enrolled after the two 1928 bar examinations, for instance, the majority of whom will remain in the state, and
there are also several attorneys each year who move to Colorado from other states and are admitted without examination.
These figures are for our own state only, where the number of law students and candidates for the bar now remains
fairly constant, the number in local law schools being no
greater today than it was five years ago. In the nation at
large also, the profession is growing, but judging by the increase in law students, the growth in the nation is at an accelerating rate and has not kept down the way it has begun
to in Colorado. Mr. Alfred Z. Reed, of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, states that there
were 24,503 students in American Law Schools in 1919-1920
and 44,340 in 1925-1926, an increase of over 80 per centum in
six years. His estimate for the fall of 1927 is 46,786. In New
York City, Dean Young B. Smith of Columbia Law School
points out that the half dozen larger law schools there had a
combined enrollment of 2,705 in 1916, which increased to
6,225 in 1923, and to more than 10,000 in 1928.
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If no new attorneys had been admitted to practice in the
United States during the past year or two, it is probable that
the attorneys already in practice could have met the public's
legal needs, which means that the profession is in a position
to experiment, if it wishes, with the raising of standards for
admission to its ranks, and the experimenting is taking place.
This is something which the lawyers have been slow to
do. The profession has been on a high plane, and in spite of
occasional accusations of exclusion, no profession has been
less mercenary or less inclined to raise requirements for admission from monopolistic motives. In North Carolina, for instance, the Committee on Legal Education, under the direction of Mr. Alexander B. Andrews, made a study and tabulation last year, and found incidentally that in that state a person who had finished grammar school could become a lawyer
with one-third the further period of study which he would
have to have if he should aspire to become a chiropodist,
optometrist, or elementary school teacher. To become a dentist he would need four and a half times the course required of
candidates for the bar, and the future doctors must take a
course nearly six times as lengthy as the future lawyers.
Trained nurses in North Carolina are rather low in the scale,
and are required to have only twice the amount of higher education demanded of lawyers but the committee states that
most of the hospitals there refuse to accept nurses who have
had no more than such minimum education. There are nine
states which require less from law candidates than North
Carolina requires, and six states besides which require less
from their lawyers than the one-year of high school and three
years of professional study required of North Carolina trained
nurses.
Suggestions for limiting bar admissions, or of raising
standards of education, have begun to come from the outside.
President Robert Appleton, of the Association of Grand
Jurors of New York County, speaks favorably of the suggestion for conditional admission to the bar, withholding
life-time admission until after a period of probation and observation. Mr. Alfred Z. Reed, who, although a leading
authority on legal education, is not a lawyer, points out that
the law is a public profession, requiring a high standard of
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character and ability, and that the public is directly interested
in the profession's personnel and training. His own special
interest is in legal education, which he has greatly furthered
by his writings and reports.
This article is not intended to urge restriction of numbers, nor increase of numbers in the profession, but merely
to report on what is going on. Within the legal profession
there has been great breadth and tolerance on the subject of
bar admissions and preparation, aside from the desire of
members to avoid accusations of selfishness. Those within
the profession who have given thought to the matter have
been inclined to assume that some other organization than
their own was considering the problem. The American Bar
Association has realized that admission to practice is a matter
for each state to settle for itself. Many of the state bar
associations are only moderately active and they do not universally have Committees on Legal Education with a bent
for research. Some of the most active and well organized
bar associations have been those of counties and cities, whose
primary attention has been given to questions of less than
statewide import. The lawyers have perhaps taken it for
granted that the law schools are organized on this subject
and are working to secure higher requirements for admission
to practice in the several states, both of which the law schools
generally are not. In Massachusetts, for instance, a candidate
for the bar need have only two years of night high school, or
its equivalent, by way of pre-legal education, while the commonwealth's oldest law school, Harvard, has for thirty years
been requiring college graduation as the pre-legal minimum
for entrance. The state and the school have gone their respective ways and there is no indicatiod that either of these
two institutions has any inclination to try to convert the other,
or that it would be desirable. The question of enlarging or
contracting the list of lawyers is for the lawyers.
The American Bar Association manifested an interest
as early as 1890 when its membership was 1000 as compared
with the present 26,595. Its Section on Legal Education was
created in 1893, and in 1897 the Association endorsed high
school graduation and a three year course of law study as
requirements for admission to the bar. This position was

DICTA

again affirmed in 1908 and 1918. In 1921 the Association
recommended two years of study in college, followed by a
three year period of law study, as a requisite for admission to
practice, and has for several years given wide publicity to
the recommendation. It has met generally with approval
or indifference rather than with any active opposition. This
1921 requirement is now effective in 122 per cent. of the

states, and the same requirement, or something beyond, is in
force in 42 per cent. of the law schools as the requirement for
graduation. The law schools have been more responsive than
the states. For the law schools observing these standards and
certain further standards, there is the Association of American Law Schools, which by the reward of membership has
furnished a further incentive to law schools for self-improvement, and has caused them to be less inclined to stand still
than the states have been.
The American Bar Association's Council on Legal Education now has regulations which make its standards the
same as those of the Association of American Law Schools,
and the Council publishes from time to time the names of
law schools which comply with its standards. The Council
is directed by the American Bar Association "to make such
publications available so far as possible to intending law
students". Sixty-five of the country's 175 law schools are on
the Council's approved list and of these same 65 law schools,
62 are members of the Association of American Law Schools.
The Council's persuasion and the influence of the Association of American Law Schools is upon the schools rather
than upon the states, and it has been here shown that in percentage of compliance with recommended standards the
schools have risen above the level of the states. In the direction'of supplying the bar of the future with fewer and better
lawyers, about all has been accomplished for the present that
can be accomplished by working on the schools. Of the 110
schools which are not yet approved by the Council on Legal
Education, two or three a year in the next few years may
succeed in meeting the standards, but many of them cannot
do it until the states in which they are located raise the
standards for admission to practice. Harvard and Columbia,
with their high standards, have been able to flourish in states
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which have in the past had low bar admission requirements,
because Harvard and Columbia are financially independent,
and a majority of the law schools of state universities have
been able to also, for a like reason. It is to be noted, however, that only one-eleventh of New York City's law students
are at Columbia, Columbia being the city's sixth school in
size, and that Harvard Law School has two neighbors that
are both larger in enrollment than she is, so that the bar's
benefit from receiving Harvard and Columbia trained members is diluted by the influx from other sources.
The principle may be elaborated upon by an illustration
from a neutral point like Arizona. In Arizona the state's
only law school requires two years of college for admission,
while for admission to the bar of Arizona, one need apparently have no more than a grade school education, or perhaps even less. If the state had a large population and several
metropolitan centers with law schools in them requiring only
grade school education for admission, there would be a sixyear differential against the state's standard law school and in
favor of the schools founded on the strength of lenient bar
admission requirements. The heavier enrollment would be
in the short-cut schools and the additions to the bar of the
state would be more from that type of school than from the
school requiring the six years of pre-legal training. This is
what has happened in some of the more thickly populated
states, and is why many of the 110 unapproved law schools
cannot raise entrance requirements and other standards until
their states raise bar admission requirements. New York, by
the way, has now raised its requirements for the bar to two
years of college plus three years of law school, effective
October 15, 1929.
At present therefore, the situation is that over one-third
of the country's law schools are observing American Bar Association standards, some of them being influenced and aided
to do so by the rules of the Council and the Schools Association. The number of approved schools is slowly increasing
and the proportion may reach one-half of the total number of
American schools within the next few years, but meanwhile,
from two-thirds to one-half of the admissions to the bar will
be from the schools not so approved, and some of the schools
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not approved are not susceptible to the influence of either the
Council or the Association, and will remain unapproved. The
situation will stay fairly stationary until the states whose requirements for admission to practice are below those recommended by the American Bar Association raise the standards
gradually to those of the American Bar Association, thereby
gradually decreasing the present differential in favor of
schools designed for the passing of bar examinations rather
than for preparation for the after years of practice.
Some states are increasing the severity of their bar examinations. It is almost impossible, however, to devise a bar
examination which will perfectly separate the sheep from
the goats, and instead of trying by the examination to check
the invasion of applicants at the state's last line of defense, it
is fairer both to the state and the candidate to do some of the
checking by a process of selection at an earlier period in the
candidate's career. In Massachusetts in December, 1927,
there were 498 candidates who took the bar examinations and
66% failed. In examinations of November, 1927, in Maryland, and March, 1928, in Rhode Island, the failures respectively were 69% and 79%, percentages which are materially
higher than in the states requiring a larger amount of educational preparation of candidates. Would it not have been a
better method of choosing future lawyers to have required a
year or two more of study preceding the bar examinations,
rather than to induce a period of cramming following a failure? The cramming will be with examinations in view,
rather than preparation for practice.
There was little criticism a generation ago of requiring
high school graduation of our future lawyers. Today there
is nearly as high a proportion of the. population who have
completed two years of college, or who have had the opportunity to, as there used to be who had completed high school.
Not only have colleges increased in number and doubled and
trebled in enrollment, but summer schools, extension courses
and the like have become far more common than formerly.
The junior college movement, covering the first two years
of the college course, is so recent that many of us have 'not
awakened to it. The 1928 "Blue Book" lists some 374 junior
colleges in our 48 states, in addition to our older colleges and
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universities. It is possible that a present day requirement of
two years of college does not represent a real increase over
the apparently lower requirements of thirty years ago.
What has been accomplished to date, in planning the
make-up of the next generation in the profession, is that Colorado and five other states require two years of college plus
three years of law school, of future attorneys, these requirements for the most part being put into force very gradually,
to give ample notice. Colorado extended every consideration
to those whose preparation had begun under earlier rules, and
hardships were avoided when possible. Several additional
states seem likely to join these six in the near future. Delicacy
interferes with suggesting to a sister state that she raise her
bar admission requirements, but example is very effective. In
Colorado the number of new attorneys per annum is not growing larger. Law schools, under the regulations of Colorado
and many other states, have largely superseded law offices as a
place of preparation for the bar. Colorado's law schools all
require their graduates to have two years of college work,
followed by three years of law school study, and the same is
true of over a third of the country's law schools.
The American Bar Association's Council and the Association of American Law Schools have gotten into close touch
and co-operation, with increased effectiveness, and have created a standard by which law schools can be measured and
compared. The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement
of Teaching is making elaborate and impartial studies of
the work of these two organizations, and of legal education,
and is giving them publicity. The Colorado authorities
have made full use of the material in recent revisions of
rules, as have the authorities of Illinois, Kansas, New York,
Ohio and West Virginia. Montana and Wisconsin are close
behind. When the bench and bar of other sections come to
consider the data now so complete and accessible, it seems
likely that other states, whose bar admission requirements
were fixed before there were ready reference works on the
subject, will act in the mattter, and revise their bar admission
requirements upward or downward, consistently with the
policies upon which they determine.

REAL ESTATE TITLE EXAMINATIONS
By Arnold Weinberger of the Denver Bar
HIS paper is intended for lawyer and layman alike, as
a plea for adequate compensation for the members of
the legal profession who must (unfortunately) devote
their time to the examination of titles to real estate-among
the most important, yet least remunerative, of all services
they are called upon to render.
The work of examining real estate titles has grown to
enormous proportions during the past few years. As long as
thirty-six years ago, our Court of Appeals in Taylor v.
Williams, 2 Colo. App. 561, had occasion to observe that:
"Few persons purchase real estate at the present time without obtaining
from the vendor an abstract of the vendor's title and with the view of having
such title passed upon by some one learned in the law."

There has been an unprecedented increase in real estate
loans, transfers, financing programs and transactions of every
kind and character, due to the general commercial and industrial expansion, the great influx of population, the rapid
growth of cities, towns and rural districts, and the extraordinary building activity that has been prevalent everywhere in the United States. This has not been without its
effect on the legal profession. The business of title examinations, which, prior to this era of expansion constituted only a
very small part of a lawyer's practice, has increased in proportion to the general prosperity of the land, so that today it
is a very important part of his work.
It has been said that no question of law more constantly
presents itself in the average law practice than that of the title
to real estate. And this, notwithstanding the inroads made
by title guaranty companies on this type of work, which
formerly was an exclusive function of the legal profession,
for it still seems that the average careful investor desires the
independent old fashioned examination by his attorney,
although often in conjunction with a title guaranty policy.
A brief reference to the history and development of abstracts of title and title examinations will suggest why title
examination work has become so important.
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Warvell, Thompson, Martindale and other writers on
the subject agree that there is little definite information concerning the origin of the practice of furnishing abstracts of
title. Yet they are used generally throughout the civilized
world, although the systems employed are vastly different.
In England there is evidence of the use of abstracts for
some considerable length of time. References to their use
are found in English writings during the early part of the
Nineteenth Century as an established custom and practice. In
England abstracts are made from the original instruments
comprising the chain of title and title examinations are made
from such abstracts or the original instruments themselves.
In this way, the use of the abstract of title probably originated.
There was great danger of the loss of the various muniments
of title. Hence the owners were loath to part with them and
furnished the abstract instead. Notwithstanding the adoption
of the Torrens Registration System in 1875, the custom of
making abstracts from the original unrecorded documents in
England has never been abandoned and still prevails. It is
the practice for the vendor's attorney to prepare the abstract
and submit it, together with the original documents of title,
to the attorney for the vendee, who compares them and determines whether the abstract correctly and fairly shows the
condition of the title. If there are any objections, the attorney
for the vendee makes so-called "requisitions" for corrections.
These objections must be made and certified within a specified
time or they are deemed waived and the title is considered
accepted.
In this country, the English system was adopted in the
colonial states and to a great extent still prevails in the eastern
part of the United States. It has been departed from in the
middle and western states, where abstracts are prepared from
the public records instead of the original instruments; a procedure which is so familiar to all lawyers that it requires no
further explanation. However, in this country during the
earlier years, abstracts were practically not used at all. There
was little necessity for their use for title passed by inspecting
the original deeds and instruments of title and by the vendor's
"warrantee" deed. With this and the covenants contained
therein, the purchaser was satisfied. Conveyances and changes

DICTA

in title were infrequent. The average purchaser relied to a
great extent on the possession of the seller as conclusive evidence of his ownership, and on his deed of transfer. But with
the passing of the years and the ever increasing commercial
activity and development, property began to change hands
more frequently and the old method was no longer convenient
or practicable. Laws were passed everywhere which facilitated the transfer of titles; property disqualifications were
gradually removed; titles soon became encumbered and involved with numerous ownerships; legal questions began to
arise concerning the sufficiency of conveyances; real estate
became more valuable and purchasers more careful. They no
longer relied on the past or the present. Possession under the
new order was only an incident of ownership, and the
"warrantee" deed merely evidence thereof. The owner must
look forward to the future and be careful to see that his title
will be accepted by a subsequent purchaser. All of these and
many other considerations gave rise to the development of the
modern abstract of title and, as an indispensable incident
thereto, the trained and qualified title examiner.
In the course of a pending real estate transaction, there
are often great delays because of title defects, due to many
causes, some of which will now be considered. '
In the first place, seldom, if ever, does the vendor of
property have his title examined before entering into a contract of sale. It is rather the custom to do it afterwards. There
are often party-wall agreements, restrictions, reservations,
rights of way, easements and many other similar encumbrances
involved in a title which should be excepted or provided for
in the contract and which, obviously, will be overlooked unless there is an examination of the abstract prior to drawing
the contract. The dangers involved and the difficulties to be
avoided are well stated by Martindale in his work on Abstracts of Title, in which the author says:
"Title Should be Investigated Before Sale is Contracted. It often
happens that a defect in the title, disclosed to a purchaser, leads to a claim
by a person who may assert a title founded on this defect; it is, therefore, a
very prudent caution on the part of sellers to have their title thoroughly
investigated by their own counsel before they offer their lands for sale, so
that they may be satisfied that there is no reasonable chance of exposing their
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Nor is this the only advantage to be derived from such a previous investigation,
under the advice of those who are conversant with the subject. The formal
difficulties with which the title may be attended may be pointed out; the
necessary steps may be taken to remove the cloud; or, if the defect be found
insurmountable, provision may be made in the conditions of sale against the
production of proof of any deed or other fact, so far as to compel a purchaser
to accept a conveyance without the same. As a consequence of the want of
such precaution in having the title examined, and all matters of dispute growing out of it settled, before entering into a contract, delay is often occasioned,
interest on purchase money lost, and expensive litigation incurred in seeking
to enforce or resist specific performance of the agreement.
It would be a wise precaution on the part of real estate agents and
brokers to adopt a rule requiring sellers to furnish an abstract of their titles
before placing the property upon the market, in order that they might be
enabled to protect the interests of their clients in contracting for its sale, and
that buyers might know what title they were negotiating for; besides this,
a sale is often defeated in the time it takes to prepare an abstract, where one
has not been prepared in advance. Moreover, an abstractor should not be
compelled to make a hurried search."

Secondly, an unusually large number of persons deal in
real estate without any title examination at all. They are
satisfied to accept the title because the seller said he had had
it examined or so and so passed it for a loan. Much to their
discomfort, they may soon ascertain that the title is being
held up on account of defects. This often results in losing a
profitable deal.
There is more truth than fiction in the story that is told
of the person who became involved in title litigation and
thought he had a good title when he bought the property because the seller furnished an abstract of title in a handsome
blue cover, with a beautiful gold seal and red ribbon on it.
Frequently, an investor prefers to act as his own lawyer
or permit others outside the legal profession to meddle with
titles, not appreciating the importance of referring this work
to those specially trained for it, until some difficulty arises.
Often it is then too late and irreparable loss may follow. Said
Judge Cooley many years ago, in the introduction to his excellent edition of Blackstone:
"Real estate has been cheap; we have been near the sources of title; conveyances of any particular parcel have not generally been numerous, nor the
title complicated; the modes of transfer have been tolerably uniform and well
understood; we have a general system of registry designed to give purchasers
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man of plain common sense is able to understand all these, one naturally comes
to think that the nearest justice of the peace is competent to transact the business connected with his purchases and sales, and that his own good sense is
sufficient to protect him against flaws in titles, or against being entrapped
through the means of inadequate conveyances of the land he buys. Unfortunately he sometimes discovers, when too late, that unaided good sense is
not always an infallible guide in matters of law, and that one who relies on
it, implicitly, is in the proper condition of mind to be made the victim of
misplaced confidence. Many a man has lost his all by assuming the sufficiency
of his own knowledge and judgment in real estate matters, and by resting
satisfied with his own examination or that of his county register of deeds,
where he ought to have called in the best legal advice that was attainable."

The foregoing is unquestionably sound advice today.
In the third place, many investors do not select a title
examiner with the same degree of care that they would choose
a medical adviser or specialist. The work of title examinations is indeed a specialty. It requires painstaking care and
caution in every detail of the work and a thorough knowledge
of tile numerous legal and practical problems which arise in
connection therewith and, among other things, a comprehensive understanding of the significance and meaning of every
word and term in contracts concerning real estate. As one
example-witness the subject of marketable titles. What is
a marketable title? The decisions on the subject are innumerable. Titles are indiscriminately referred to as good, marketable, perfect, satisfactory, etc., yet each one carries its own
distinctive meaning and upon that interpretation a contract
may stand or fall, a law suit be invited or forestalled. The
latter fact appears by reference to a recent 300 page annotation
in 57 A. L. R., pages 1253-1554, in which, on the subject of
marketable titles and various defects in titles, there are 957
point citations to New York cases alone, 286 to New Jersey
cases, 194 to Massachusetts, 165 to Illinois, and 167 to English
cases. Many Colorado citations are included.
In England, title examination has become "a highly
artificial system of rules and practice which maintains its
own separate body of practitioners," while "in this country the
tendency has been to loose and incoherent practice in the
examination of titles and the drawing of conveyances, and
few practitioners take the trouble to inform themselves in the
nice distinctions and technical discriminations with which the
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law of conveyancing abounds". (Martindale--"Abstractsof
Title", page 2).
The last-mentioned criticism of the profession by Martindale leads one to search for possible causes of this tendency
to a "loose and incoherent practice in the examination of
titles." If this be true, may it not be principally attributed
to the insignificant fees paid to the profession for this important service? Hasty title examinations are frequent. Why?
Because the average client, not appreciating the great volume
of work involved in, and the responsibility of the attorney
attached to title work, will not adequately compensate him
for the same. The experience of the average lawyer is about
as follows: A client comes to his office and states that he contemplates purchasing a parcel of real estate or making a loan.
The deal usually involves a considerable sum of money. He
places the abstract on his attorney's table and with it the entire
responsibility. He expects to receive an assurance that his
money will be invested or loaned safely. He immediately
dismisses all worry regarding the matter from his mind and
relies entirely on the advice of counsel. He expects the usual
opinion of title under the signature of his attorney. Several
hours, sometimes days of time must be spent in examining the
title, and among other numerous things, inquiring into the
condition of taxes, attending to a survey of the property, ascertaining the rights of those in possession, closing the deal, etc.
Counsel may be obliged to resort to the law books to determine
whether certain irregularities he may have found should be
objected to or passed. If the title is complicated by foreclosures, court proceedings or estates, still more time is consumed in examining the original records and documents on
file and weighing their legal effect. Upon completion of the
title work, the attorney proceeds to draw the deeds, mortgages,
releases or other necessary documents. He makes the required
adjustments, closes the transaction and attends to the recording
of the papers. Nor does the work cease after the opinion has
been rendered and the deal closed. The next title examiner,
at some future time, may discover something in the title about
which he is doubtful or which he deems defective and which
the previous examiner considered immaterial or inconsequential. The first examiner is then called upon to make correc-
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tions. Perhaps he relied entirely upon the abstract and did
not carefully examine the original records. Something may
have appeared therein which was not disclosed in the abstract,
or his opinion may have failed to except doubtful matters in
the title, or a real defect may have been overlooked altogether.
In the conference which follows between attorneys, a discussion ensues in which much speculation is indulged in as
to what the law is or might be with reference to the objections
raised. Sometimes they are frivolous and in fact do not affect
the marketability of the title; other times they are questionable, and in still other instances, beyond any doubt, they are
real. In the last-mentioned case, of course, there is nothing
to do but correct or quiet the title at the attorney's own expense.
In the former, the objector must be convinced that his objections are without merit, often an impossible task. And for all
the foregoing the examining attorney receives the munificent
fee of $15, with a possible additional $5 or $10 for closing the
deal, sometimes more and often less; hardly an ash hauler's
wage for the time consumed and the responsibility assumed.
The road which the title examiner must travel is rough
indeed, beset with pitfalls at every turn. For the sake of the
security of titles and property, the public sooner or later must
be educated to the necessity of adequately compensating the
profession for this highly technical work. This will insure
better title examinations and fewer title complications.

WHAT OF BAR ADMISSIONS?
By Stanley T. Wallbank of the Denver Bar
The Court: Who was the first Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court?
Applicant: (Hesitatingly) John Marshall, I think.
The Court: What is the fundamental law of the land?
Applicant: The laws made by the Legislature.
The Court: Why do you wish to practice law?
Applicant: Because it looks like the easiest way to make
money and get ahead.
Startling as the above dialogue may seem, it nevertheless is not uncommon for applicants on examination for admission to the Bar to make similar, or even more astounding,
answers, all of which suggests a few considerations of the
present method of admission to practice law in Colorado.
In striking contrast to the time when no written or formal
examinations were held,-the applicant then merely submitting to a brief oral questioning by one member of the Court
which sometimes was, although quite a delight to the Court
and the applicant, very little of a test of the aspirant's qualifications-is the present day system of examination by the
Committee of Law Examiners and the Bar Committee. The
latter is appointed by the Court to pass upon the moral and
ethical qualifications of the applicants. The Committee consists of five members, three of whom examine each applicant
personally. Theirs is a most important duty although herein
the work of the Law Examiners alone is considered.
The Committee of Law Examiners, known as the Law
Committee, consists of nine members appointed, pursuant to
rule, by the Supreme Court of Colorado, the members being
largely distributed as to geographical location and being
selected wholly apart from political, religious, social and
similar considerations. The members serve for five years.
They receive no compensation. Their responsibility obviously is to pass upon, subject to the rules, direction and supervision of the Court, the educational qualifications, general
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and legal, of all persons who apply to practice law in Colorado.
As to admissions upon motion, the present Supreme
Court rule is, in substance, that those applicants who are not
then citizens of Colorado, but have been admitted to practice
in another State, and have practiced there ten of the eleven
years immediately preceding application here, comprise
Class "A", and may be admitted upon motion, unless their
general educational qualifications are contested, in which case
proof may be required by the Law Committee, which is subject to the approval of the Court. Those who are not then
citizens of Colorado, but have been admitted to practice in
another State, and have practiced there five of the six years
immediately preceding application here, or taught for such
period in an approved law school, comprise Class "B", and
may be admitted upon motion, provided the requirements for
admission to practice in the State where the license was
granted are equal to the requirements in Colorado; subject,
of course, to the same right of contesting general educational
qualifications.
The rule has its foundation very largely in comity. Under it 119 lawyers have been admitted to practice in Colorado
since 1920. As a rule, it is believed that attorneys so admitted
upon motion meet well the educational requirements, both
general and legal, formulated by the Court.
Respecting the applicants who submit to examination, no such general satisfaction of the educational requirements is found. In fact, there appears to be a growing tendency on the part of this class of applicants to
exhibit a lack of grasp of the fundamentals of legal education and of that background of history, philosophy, political
science, economics and general education, all so requisite in
anyone who would improve or even uphold the high standing
of the profession as it has prevailed through the centuries.
It is quite common for applicants to show no fundamental
grasp of the English language, not to mention that a regrettable number seem quite unable to write their answers
to questions in any way except to make the untangling of their
undecipherable hieroglyphics a guessing contest on the part
of the examiners.
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A refreshing minority of the applicants, however, bring
delight to both the examiners and the Court in their formulation and presentation of answers from substantive, rhetorical,
grammatical, general educational and cultural aspects.
The work of the Committee is so divided that each of the
nine examiners is assigned a given subject which is one of
those covered from time to time in the examinations. The
subjects cover the important fields in law and equity and vary
from year to year. The examinations are held in July and
December of each year. The assignment of a subject is made
several months before the time of examination. Each examiner is required to prepare written questions upon the subject assigned.
A meeting of the Committee is then called, considerably
in advance of the examination, at which time all of the written questions prepared by the examiners are carefully considered by the examiners as a committee of the whole, which
results in many substitutions and amendments to questions,
and removing possible ambiguities and duplications. At least
a half day is required by the Committee for this consideration
of the questions. The revised questions are then ready for
the printer.
The present written examinations consume two full days,
four subjects usually being assigned for each day. The examiner who has prepared the questions on a given subject is
present when the written examination on his subject is held,
to be in readiness for applicants who may make bona fide inquiry concerning the form or purpose of a question and generally to supervise the examination on that subject. The Secretary of the Committee presides over all written examinations and requires the printed questions to be handed in at
the close of the session and prohibits the copying of these
questions.
Upon commencing the examination each applicant is
given a number by the Secretary of the Committee, under
which number he submits his entire examination. The name
or identity of an applicant never appears upon any of his
papers, and the number assigned is known to no member of
the Committee or Court, and only to the Secretary of the
Committee who does not participate in the examination. In

DICTA

this way, no member of the examining committee knows the
identity or authorship of any answer until all grades are submitted and made final.
The third day of the examination is given over to oral
questioning, the forenoon being devoted to oral examination
by the Supreme Court sitting en banc, and the afternoon to
individual oral examination of the applicants by the members of the Committee separately. Much insight is gained
into the qualifications of the applicants in these oral examinations, although unfortunately they are so limited in time as
to fail of their highest objectives.
After the entire examinations are completed, each examiner is given the papers in his subject, for grading. This
task is proving to be somewhat extensive. An average July
class of applicants may number 80 or more. It is not uncommon for a paper to require more than an hour for a careful
reading and review, and in many instances a re-review. Thus
many of the examiners report that ofttimes a week to two
weeks of their working hours are required before they feel
willing to complete their grades of one examination. In this
connection, as in many others, the members of the Committee
have exhibited a tireless and genuine interest in this all important task assigned to them.
The grades and papers are forwarded by each examiner
to the Secretary of the Committee, who then compiles the
grades and averages. Thereupon, a meeting of the entire
Committee is called to authorize the return to the Court of
the individual and average grades of each applicant. Only
after the Committee's recommendations are completed and
ordered certified to the Court does the examiner know for the
first time the authorship of the papers he has graded. Approximately 45% of the applicants in the most recent bar
examination in Colorado failed of admission. Since 1920
there have been 632 applicants recommended by the Committee for admission to practice law in Colorado upon examination.
The Committee in these meetings also gives serious consideration to the entire field of the examinations, to recommended improvements and to bar examination matters in general. In devising the form and character of examination the
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Committee is constantly giving serious thought to the changing educational conditions and to the type of examination that
most fairly tests the ability of the applicant.
It is conceded that if the old type of bar examinations
were strictly adhered to, many unqualified applicants, who
may have mastered printed quiz books in the various subjects,
might with facility pass the examination, so thorough and
comprehensive are such quiz books now prepared with full
answers to the questions propounded. The practice of coaching students primarily for the purpose of enabling them to
pass the examination has, of course, been rightly condemned
by all authorities and law schools of high standing. The Advisor to the Council of Legal Education of the American
Bar Association says, "Very few bar examinations have ever
been devised that a bright young man who crams intensely
for three months cannot pass." The Association thus refuses
to approve any school that "as a part of its regular course conducts instruction in law designed to coach students for bar
examinations." The problem is thus one of concentrated
cramming against proper and adequate training.
In this connection, much attention is being directed to
some of the newer tests which seek inter alia a knowledge of
the salient principles, the ability to apply a definite principle
of law to a given state of facts, the knowledge of technical
words and phrases, facility of proper expression, orally and
in writing, and a knowledge that is not born of memorizing
words which have little meaning to the memorizer. Many
of the leading law educators of the country, in order to meet
the above requirements, are recommending the long question
and short answer type of examination, also called the truefalse and new type system, whereunder the applicant must
answer a greater number of questions, his answers consisting
of "yes", "no", or the insertion of a few words, or the naming
of a legal principle. The questions are so designed as to
search fundamentally his grasp and knowledge, and cover a
larger field. Under this system the applicant is warned not
to guess, that each mistake counts as a penalty, that omitted
answers count less than penalties, and that each statement must
be taken in disregard of every other statement.
Another most promising investigation concerns the new
and elaborate Pennsylvania system of admission to practice,
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which has been. eagerly analyzed and will be as eagerly
watched to determine its practicability and efficiency.
The Committee is conscious of the two schools of thought,
the liberal and the conservative, on the subject of admissions
but, of course, is guided at all times by the direction and supervision of the Court. It is no pleasant contemplation to picture
an applicant who has completed a high school course, two
years of general college studies, and three years of approved
law school courses, who fails two or three times in his attempts
at bar examinations. But the Court in fixing standards from
time to time is not oblivious of the fact that its solemn responsibility in regulating admissions cannot be lightly regarded.
It recognizes that responsibility both toward the profession
and the public. In this connection, it may be recalled that the
number of law school students in the United States in 1926
had increased more than 80% over those in 1920, whereas the
corresponding increase in population was approximately
10%. During this same six-year period, the number of lawyers increased over 30%.
The above fragmentary and uncorrelated data is offered
in the hope that there may be inspired on the part of the Bar
generally a greater interest in the matter of admissions to
practice, and the forwarding to the Court by individuals, committees and Bar Associations of recommendations, constructive criticisms and suggestions for improvements. For do we
not as lawyers have a grave responsibility to those invited and
permitted to enter the portals of our loved profession which
for so many centuries has signified to the world leadership,
integrity and a sound administration of justice?

A

CAVEAT APPELLANT

CASE of particular interest to members of the Denver
Bar is the recent case of Halter vs. Wade, 273 Pacific
1042, because a failure to observe the rule therein
set forth may not only prevent you from getting the review
of your case in the Supreme Court, but from even being able
to get it started on its way out of the District Court.
Rule Twenty-one of the Denver District Court relates
to the Bill of Exceptions and requires that immediately after
tendering to the Judge, it shall be lodged with the Clerk, and
the party tendering same shall forthwith notify the opposite
party thereof. The rule further requires that unless the opposite party shall, within fourteen days after date of service
of notice of lodgment, file objections, that the Judge shall upon
request sign, allow and seal said Bill of Exceptions.
In the above case, the Supreme Court has interpreted this
rule and said:

"Plaintiffs in Error fail to comply with Rule Twenty-one. It was made
by the Court, consisting of seven Judges sitting enbanc. No single Judge has
the power to ignore it or waive its enforcement. It was made to be enforced
just as much so as if the Legislature by Statute enacted it, and, in that case,
no Court or Judge could properly disobey it."

The words "immediately" and "forthwith" mean exactly
what they say according to the Supreme Court. It has been
the practice among a good many attorneys here in times past
to take the Bill of Exceptions and work out their Abstract of
Record, and then when they got around to it, tender it to the
Judge and pay little attention to lodging it with the Clerk of
the Court until they are ready to get their case into the
Supreme Court.
Judge Frank McDonough of the District Court has
called our attention to this matter, the importance of it and
the fact that the Bar is apparently not familiar with this recent
decision, since already some of the Judges of the District
Court in obedience to this decision have been compelled to
decline to sign a Bill of Exceptions where Rule Twenty-one
was violated.

THE ANCESTRY OF MARBURY v. MADISON
By John H. Denison of the Denver Bar
(Former Chief Justice, Colorado Supreme Court)

ARSHALL was not the first judge to hold that the
supreme court had power to declare an act of congress
unconstitutional. The act of March 23, 1792, 1 Stat.
at Large, p. 223, relating to invalid pensions, provided "that
any officer, soldier or seaman * * * shall also be allowed such
farther sum for the arrears of pension * * * as the circuit court
of the district * * * may think just;" and made it the duty of
the judges of the circuit courts to remain five days at least,
from the opening of the session thereof to give full opportunity for the relief proposed by the act, and further "That
in any case where the Secretary (of War) should suspect imposition or mistake, he should have power to withhold the
name of the applicant from the pension list and make report
of the same to congress at their next session.
The Circuit Court for the District of New York, consisting of Jay, Cushing and Duane, took up this act. Jay was
then chief justice of the Supreme Court, Cushing was on that
bench and Duane was judge of the district court of New
York. They declined to act as a court under the above mentioned statute on the ground that "neither the legislative nor
the executive branches [of the federal government] can constitutionally assign to the judicial any duties but such as are
properly judicial and to be performed in the judicial manner;" that the duties assigned were not judicial because they
subjected the decisions of the court to consideration and suspension by the secretary of war and to the legislature; that
no executive officer or even the legislature was authorized
"to sit as a court of errors on the acts and opinions of this
court." The judges then construed the act as appointing them
personally as commissioners and thus took it upon themselves
to carry out its provisions.
In Pennsylvania the circuit court, consisting of Wilson
and Blair, Justices of the Supreme Court, and Peters, District
Judge, addressed a letter to the President to the same effect,
except that they declined to act at all. The Circuit Court for
the District of North Carolina, consisting of Iredell, Asso-
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ciate Justice of the Supreme Court, and Sitgreaves, District
Judge, addressed a letter to the President, in which they set
forth the same matters, construing, obviously correctly, though
contrary to New York, the statute as referring to the court and
not to the judges of it. They nevertheless resolved to act as
commissioners on account of the serious consequences to "unfortunate and meritorious individuals" if they refused their
cause. Thereupon Attorney General Randolph moved for
mandamus in the supreme court of the United States against
the circuit court for the district of Pennsylvania, to compel
that court to obey the act. The supreme court took the matter
under advisement but before decision congress repealed the
act by the Act of Feb. 28th, 1793, 1 St. at Large, p. 374,
Hayburn's Case and Notes, 2 Dallas, 409.
The great constitutional question decided in Marbury v.
Madison, is said by Senator Beveredge not to have been essential to the decision of that case. Whatever may be true as to
that, it is certain that the circuit courts of New York and
Pennsylvania, with four of the five* supreme justices sitting
thereon, in refusing to perform the duties placed upon them
by an act of congress on the ground that that act was unconstitutional, did not merely declare but held it to be so; that
their colleague, Iredell, agreed with them we know and we
know, therefore, that the supreme court of the United States
at that time was unanimous upon the point decided by Marshall and his colleagues twenty years later. The importance
of this lies not in the fact that it adds the mere authority of
these judges to that of Marshall and his colleagues in support
of the. principle stated in Marbury v. Madison, but that it
shows that the maintenance of that principle was inevitable,
and that it was recognized in what Mr. Dallas, the reporter,
says was the first case in which the constitutional question was
presented, and was agreed to by all the judges upon exactly
the grounds which governed the opinion of the great Chief
Justice.
It is interesting also to note that in the Federalist the
proposition later declared by the courts is asserted and taken
for granted and made the basis of further deductions (Fedst.
Nos. 53 and 78).
*Johnson had then been appointed but had not qualified.

COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(ED]ToR's Nom.-It is intended in each issue of DICTA to print brief abstracts
of the decisions of the Supreme Court. These abstracts will be printed only after the
time within which a petition for rehearing may be filed has elapsed without such action being taken, or in the event that a petition for rehearing has been filed the abstract
will be printed only after the petition has been disposed of.)

BOARD OF DENTAL EXAMINERS-JURISDICTION-PROHIBITION

-No. 12108-People vs. State Board of Dental Examiners,
et al-Decided March 4, 1929.
Facts.-Mahurin, a dentist employed by Painless Parker
Dentist, a California corporation, filed a petition in the Denver District Court for a writ of prohibition against the Board
to restrain it from determining his right to practice dentistry.
Mahurin conceded that the decision in this case depended
upon the right of the employer corporation to operate dental
offices in Colorado.
Held.-In the companion case, No. 12050, the Supreme
Court held that the corporation could not practice dentistry
in Colorado. The writ of prohibition in this case was, therefore, properly refused.
Judgment Affirmed.
BULK SALES LAW-VARIANCE-No. 11937-Englewood State
Bank vs. Tegtman-Decided March 18, 1929.
Facts.-Tegtman, the owner of a store, sold the store to
Dolton, with an agreement that if Dolton did not pay the entire
purchase price within a certain time, Tegtman had the right
to take back possession of the store and stock of merchandise.
The payment was not made and Tegtman repossessed himself
of the store and the stock. The Bank levied an execution on
the stock of merchandise upon a judgment against Dolton
only, and Tegtman recovered judgment for damages.
Held.-The Bulk Sales Law has no application to the
facts in this case. The transaction between Tegtman and
Dolton was more nearly like a mortgage than a sale, and as
such did not come within the terms of the Bulk Sales Law.
There was no variance between the pleadings and the
proof.
Judgment Affirmed.
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CONTRACT-MEETING OF THE MINDS-INSTRUCTIONS-No.

12027-Babcock vs. Bouton, et al.-Decided March 11,
1929.
Facts.-This action was brought to recover money alleged
to be due under a contract whereby Bouton, as buyer, and
Babcock, as seller, agreed to the purchase and sale of an oil
lease for $1,500.00. Shortly thereafter Babcock telegraphed
Bouton a new offer for the lease "as agreed to by us in Denver." In reply Bouton wired his acceptance.
Babcock testified that he understood that the instructions
as agreed to referred to the provisions of the first contract.
Bouton testified that he had in mind the terms of an oral
agreement, and contended that there was no meeting of the
minds. He tendered to the trial court an instruction that the
minds of all the parties must have met before there could be
a valid contract. The Court refused to give this instruction,
but did instruct the jury that the parties had made a valid
contract and that if Bouton was ready, able and willing to
comply with its terms, and that Babcock had failed to perform, the finding should be for Bouton.
Held.-The instruction requested by Babcock should
have been given, but the ones above mentioned should not have
been given because: (1) The question of the meeting of the
minds should have been left to the jury; and (2) Bouton
must not only have been ready, able and willing to perform
his part of the bargain but must actually have delivered, or
offered to deliver the assignments of leases.
Judgment Reversed and Case Remanded.
DAMAGES-MALPRACTICE-MUNICIPAL

CORPORATIONS-No.

11958-Meek vs. City of Loveland-Decided March 18,
1929.
Facts.-Meek brought action for damages against the
City of Loveland, mayor, city physician, chief of police, police
officer and county physician, for negligently amputating plaintiff's leg. Plaintiff had been drinking, was accosted by a police
officer, started to run and was shot by the officer and without
any criminal charges being filed was thereafter forcefully removed from his home and taken into the county poor farm
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against his will by the chief of police and city physician, where
the amputation was performed by the county physician. Nonsuit was granted in the Court below.
Held.-I. City not liable for damages by reason of
county physician's malpractice, if any.
2. City physician and chief of police were liable if acting
together they caused plaintiff to be removed forcefully and
against his will to the poor farm, as the jury would be warranted in finding that they both knew that an amputation was
at least probable and by their actions subjected him to treatment by the county physician.
3. County physician is liable for his own negligence and
chief of police and city physician liable on theory that plaintiff's injury was suffered by reason of their act in forcefully
sending him to the poor farm, and, knowingly, subjecting him
to surgical treatment.
Judgment Reversed.
DENTISTRY-PRACTICE BY CORPORATION-NO.

12050-People

vs. PainlessParker Dentist, Decided March 4, 1929.
Facts.-The people brought this action against defendant,
Painless Parker Dentist, a California corporation, for unlawfully usurping the franchise of practicing dentistry in Colorado without a license. The defendant demurred on the
grounds that it appeared from the complaint that the defendant was a corporation, therefore could not practice dentistry,
and that the complaint did not state a cause of action. In
argument defendant counsel suggested that the actual work
was done by dentists regularly licensed to practice in Colorado, but this does not appear in the pleadings.
Held.-The demurrer admits that the corporation had
been practicing dentistry, which our statutes forbid. It is
no defense that it is impossible, in the nature of things, for
a corporation to pass an examination as to its character and
ability. If the defendant desires to raise the point that the
dental work is done by licensed practitioners it should do this
by answer and not by demurrer.
Judgment Reversed and Case Remanded.

DICTA
GASOLINE TAX-INJUNCTION-No.

12,043-Rio

Oil and

Supply Company vs. James Duce, et al.-DecidedFebruary
27, 1929.
Facts.-Plaintiff company, as a buyer, seller and user of
gasoline, brought suit against the defendant state officials to
enjoin them from assessing the gasoline tax, and also to have
the act levying the tax declared unconstitutional.
Held.-This case is not equitable in its nature, because
the statute provides a speedy and adequate remedy, namely;
to pay the tax and then sue to recover it. This action, therefore, cannot be maintained.
Judgment Affirmed.
GASOLINE TAX-METHOD OF IMPOSITION-STATUTORY PEN-

ALTY-No. 12185-People vs. Texas Company-Decided
February 27, 1929.
Facts.-The State brought this action against the Company to recover a balance claimed on gasoline sold by the
Company in May, 1927, and for a penalty for an alleged failure to pay such tax according to law. The Company paid the
tax on gasoline actually sold during that month, but objects
to the payment of a tax on gasoline "offered for sale", claiming that the statute means "sold or used"; that it would otherwise be subject to double taxation; that the statute as attempted
to be construed by the State is unconstitutional; that the gasoline should be measured at the time of sale and not beforehand; that the tax interferes with interstate commerce; that
it is unfair to assess the tax on gasoline in the Company's tanks
because of evaporation; that a tax cannot be levied on gasoline sold to the United States; and that the penalty should not
be enforced in this case.
Held.-The statute means "offered for sale," whether
actually used or not; there is no danger of double taxation;
constitutional questions are not necessarily involved; the gasoline is at least impliedly offered for sale in the Company's
tanks, and it is immaterial that most of it is actually sold at filling stations; the act specifically avoids interfering with interstate commerce; the State is entitled to a tax on all gasoline
offered for sale and it is immaterial that part of this may dis-
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appear through evaporation or otherwise; it is true that a
tax cannot be levied on gasoline sold to the United States. The
statutory provision for penalty is upheld but may not be enforced here because of the peculiar facts in this case.
Judgment Reversed.
DECISIS-No. 12149-Roberts, et al vs.
et
al.-Decided
March 11, 1929.
Gross,
Facts.-Gross brought mandamus to compel the building inspector of the City of Pueblo to issue a permit for the
erection of a building. On the authority of Chamberlain vs.
Roberts, 81 Colo. 83, the trial court granted the writ.
Held.--The Chamberlain case is decisive of this one.
Judgment Affirmed.
MANDAMUS-STARE

12095-Spears vs.
Cook-Decided March 4, 1929.
Facts.-Spears held Cook's promissory note dated
November 12, 1925, payable three years thereafter, without
providing for the acceleration of maturity in case of default.
This note was secured by a deed of trust providing that the
total of principal, interest, etc., should become due at the
option of the holder upon any default in payment of principal
or interest. There was a default in payment of 'the interest
and Spears brought this action to obtain judgment for the
entire amount of the note, but without asking for foreclosure
of the mortgage.
Held.-When judgment on the note only is prayed, the
acceleration clause in the mortgage does not apply. The lower
court was right in entering judgment for accrued interest only.
Judgment Affirmed.
PROMISSORY NOTE-ACCELERATION.-NO.

DISTRIcTs-DIVISION-No.
12058-Fanseleau vs.
Harker-DecidedMarch 18, 1929.
Facts.-The president and board of directors of School
District No. 4 brought suit against the president and board
of directors of School District No. 10 to restrain the defendSCHOOL
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ants from interfering with the official functions of the firstnamed Board. School District No. 10 was attempted to be
carved out of School District No. 4. There were three townships No. 12 in School District No. 4 at the time of the attempted change. The notice of election merely referred to
Township 12, but did not designate what particular township
12 of the District would be effected. In the Petition for
creation of the new district, the territory to be segregated was
not described.
Held.-The election was void. The voters were entitled
to know what territory was to be segregated from the old district and placed in the new district. The information given
them in the notice of election failed to furnish the necessary
information.
Judgment Affirmed.
VIOLATION OF ORDINANCE-INDUCEMENT BY PUBLIC OFFICER

-No. 12293-City of Canon City vs. Landen-Decided
March 4, 1929.
Facts.-Defendant is charged with violating an ordinance of Canon City. The evidence discloses that a municipal
detective furnished money with which the defendant willingly
bought liquor in violation of the ordinance. The trial court
instructed the jury that the verdict should be for the defendant
if it appeared that the officer had induced this violation of
the law. The verdict was for the defendant.
Held.-There are no facts in this case making the above
instruction applicable, because the defendant knowingly and
willingly violated the law.
Judgment Reversed and Case Remanded.
WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION-REOPEN ING

OF

CASE-No.

12236-Colorado Fuel and Iron Company vs. Industrial
Commission and Medina-DecidedFebruary 4, 1929.
Facts.-Medina, an employee of the Fuel & Iron Company, was injured December 10, 1924, and thereafter brought
proceedings for Workmen's Compensation. On May 16,
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1927, the referee entered an award setting forth that Medina
had suffered no permanent disability. December 14, 1927, a
letter was written to the Commission in behalf of the claimant,
asking that the case be reopened. The Commission complied
with this request without setting forth any reasons for doing
so. On January 30, 1928, the Commission found that Medina
had sustained 25% permanent total disability. The Company
appealed to the District Court, where it was defeated.
Held.-The Commission had the power to re-open the
case on its own motion, even though the award of May 16,
1927, was a final determination. The record in the case discloses that there was error, mistake or change in conditions.
Judgment Affirmed.
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